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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ANTHONY SLATTERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020769-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether trial counsel's failure to move to exclude Velasquez's eyewitness 
identification constituted ineffective assistance at trial? In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1 
P.3d 546 (citations omitted). Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
raised for the first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State 
v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Slattery's conviction for 
aggravated assault? "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, 118, 10 P.3d 346,352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
Because this issue was not preserved below, it is reviewed for plain error. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 at 111. Alternatively, this issue should be reviewed to determine whether 
defense counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel? Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised lor the first 
time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 
1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Joseph Anthony Slattery appeals form the judgment, sentence, and commitment 
of the Third Judicial District Court after a conviction of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Joseph Anthony Slattery was charge by information filed in the Third District 
Court on December 5, 2001 with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5403 (R. 1-3). 
On February 2, 2002, Slattery filed a Written Demand to State Place, Date & 
Time of Offense (R. 29). Subsequently, Slattery filed Defendant's Written Notice of 
Intention to Claim Alibi (R. 39-40). 
A jury trial was held July 29-30, 2002 (R. 138, 139). The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of aggravated assault (R. 102; 139: 650). 
On September 5, 2002, based upon Slattery's conviction for aggravated assault, 
he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison; the prison term was suspended and Slattery was ordered to serve 60 days in jail 
and he was placed on probation for 24 months (R. 140: 8-9). 
On September 20, 2002, Slattery, pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in the Third 
District Court from the judgment, sentence, and commitment in this case (R. 114). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Rachel Velasquez 
Rachel Velasquez testified that she was employed at Wal-Mart as a cashier, 
located at 5400 South and Redwood Road (R. 138: 71, 111). On Saturday, October 13, 
2001, Velasquez got of work at midnight, when the store closed (R. 138: 71). That 
night, she was wearing black jeans, a green T-shirt and a green, light jacket (R. 138: 
74). Velasquez testified that she remembers clocking out "exactly at 12:00 midnight" 
(R. 138: 72, 120). 
Velasquez testified that it would take "a couple of minutes" to walk out of Wal-
Mart after punching out because of the distance between the punch-out clock and the 
exit (R. 138: 122). Velasquez also testified that she may have talked with someone 
before she went to her car outside to leave (R. 138: 122). Eventually, after she clocked 
out, she went to her car parked in the parking lot (R. 138: 73, 122). Velasquez 
testified that the car, a Nissan Altima, was actually her mothers, and that it was parked 
"pretty much by itself and "there wasn't much lighting" around the cai (R. 138: 75, 
123). 
Velasquez testified that she got into her car, put her seatbelt on, and put her key 
in the ignition when a man "knocked on my window" (R. 138: 75). The man informed 
her that he needed help to get his truck jump started (R. 138: 78). Velasquez told the 
man that she did not have any jumper cables, but the man said he had some (R. 138: 
78). Velasquez then asked him if he had asked the security people to help him, but the 
man stated that the security people would not help him (R. 138: 78). Velasquez then 
got worried and realized that he had been drinking because "I could smell it" so she 
attempted to close her car door (R. 138: 79). But the man told her "No, you're going 
to help me" and then reached in and jabbed her with his right hand (R. 138: 79-80, 
177-78). Velasquez testified that she knew the man stabbed her because she felt a pain 
"on my left side," "on my ribs" (R. 138: 81). 
Velasquez then started screaming and honking her horn and the man "walked off 
behind me, back where he came from" (R. 138: 80, 82). She then shut the door and 
started the car and drove back near the side of the exit door to Wal-Mart (R. 138: 82) 
She drove up to Scott Molis and while she was still in the car, she told him what just 
happened (R. 138: 83, 85). The attacker was still in the parking lot by his truck and 
she pointed the man out to Molis (R. 138: 83). 
While she was talking to Molis, Velasquez lifted up her shirt and said, "oh, my 
gosh, and there's blood everywhere" (R. 138: 84). At this point, Molis told her to go 
inside and call the police and that he would chase the man (R. 138: 84). 
Velasquez went back into the store and someone called the police (R. 138: 87). 
While in Wal-Mart, she talked with Jay Primacio, but testified that she thought she was 
in shock and had to sit down (R. 138: 87-88). 
The police arrived about five or ten minutes later and questioned Velasquez and 
took photographs of her (R. 138: 88-89). Velasquez testified that she told Officer Stacy 
Campbell that the man had a "full beard" and that he appeared to be in the age range of 
30 to 49 (R. 138: 132-33). Velasquez stayed at Wal-Mart and talked with the police 
until 12:30 or 12:45, and then she went to the hospital (R. 138: 89). 
Velasquez testified that she did not remember giving the police a description of 
the assailant's truck that night, but she testified at trial that she remembered that the 
truck "was a two-door, a light blue, it was either a Ford or Chevy and the back bumper 
was kinda messed up and the license plate was to the right, it was not in the middle of 
it, like normal, it was to the right" (R. 138: 90-91). Velasquez also testified that she 
may have told someone that the truck had a tailgate (R. 139: 578). Velasquez further 
testified that she saw the name Chevy or Ford on the tailgate (R. 139: 586). 
Velasquez testified that the man that attacked her "had a baseball cap on, 
shoulder length hair, [and] a flannel jacket," and a beard that was "brown and 
scraggly" (R. 138: 76). His cap was a "dark color," and his jacket was plaid with 
"two colors" (R. 138: 76). His hair was straight, either brown or black and not in a 
pony tail (R. 138: 130). Velasquez testified that she could not see the man that well 
because of the light and because "he was in the shadows" (R. 138: 128). Velasquez 
testified that she thinks she told Officer Campbell that the man was in his 40's, but 
admitted that at the preliminary hearing she changed her testimony and testified that the 
man was in his "20 to 30's" (R. 138: 133). 
Velasquez further testified that on October 23, about a "week and a half after 
the incident, she went to the police station to look at pictures in order to identify her 
assailant (R. 138: 95, 141). Officer Townsend showed her six photographs and 
Velasquez testified that "she was led to believe" that Slattery was one of the individuals 
pictured in the photo array (R. 138: 95, 138). Velasquez identified an individual in the 
photo array as the person that attacked her (R. 138: 95). However, the individual she 
identified in the photo array was not Slattery (R. 138: 95, 138). Moreover, she was 
told that the individual she picked out was not the person they suspected (R. 138: 139). 
On the same date, Townsend took Velasquez to Slattery's house to see Slattery's 
Chevy truck and saw that it had a black net on the back of it instead of a tailgate (R 
139: 578, 582). Velasquez testified that "I was surprised" that the truck had a net 
instead of a tailgate (R. 139: 579, 586). Velasquez also testified that she looked at the 
license plate and "I realized I had the number in my pocket" (R. 139: 578). Velasquez 
testified that she found a slip of paper in her coat pocket containing writing on it: one 
was written by her friend Maria and contained Maria's phone number and the other 
numbers were written by her manager (R. 138: 101, 106). Velasquez testified that she 
thought that the other number was written by her manager, Tina, and it was "the 
license plate number" (R. 138: 101, 107). However, Velasquez testified that she could 
not be sure that her manager was the one that wrote down the license plate number on 
the paper (R. 138: 108). Velasquez testified that she had been given the paper the night 
of the incident, but she did not know a license plate number was on it until two weeks 
later (R. 138: 102). 
At a later date, apparently Officer Townsend asked Velasquez, "why don't you 
just still come in and try and see if you can pick him" (R. 138: 141). On November 
14, 2001, Velasquez went to the police station again in an attempt to identify the man 
that attacked her (R. 138: 141). Velasquez was shown six photos and was told that 
these six photos "are newer pictures" (R. 138: 142). Again, Velasquez did not identify 
Slattery as her attacker, but instead identified someone else (R. 138: 142). Velasquez 
testified that one of the officers then told her, "You know what? It's not that guy." (R. 
138: 143). 
Velasquez testified that she was at the preliminary hearing held on February 5, 
2002, and during the preliminary hearing, she answered all of the questions to the best 
of her knowledge (R. 138: 94). When asked "Is there anything that you said at the 
preliminary hearing that you think you could explain better now as a result of the lapse 
of time," Velasquez testified "No" (R. 138: 94). Velasquez then testified "I am sure" 
that Slattery was the individual that attacked her (R. 138: 94). 
However, Velasquez testified that at the preliminary hearing, Detective 
Townsend pointed out Joseph Slattery to her before she ever took the stand to testify 
and told her, "That's Joseph Slattery" (R. 13 138: 143). Moreover, Velasquez 
testified that at the preliminary hearing, when she was asked how sure was she that 
Slattery was the individual that attacked her, she said it was only "above fifty percent" 
(R. 138: 146). 
Additionally, Velasquez testified that she did not see the man's eyes, nose, 
mouth or hands because they were in shadows and because his cap was pulled down 
over his face (R. 138: 147-52), and then was questioned by defense counsel how could 
she be sure that Slattery was the individual who attacked her and she was specifically 
asked by defense counsel, "I guess you want him to be the person, don't you?", and 
Velasquez testified, "I guess I do" (R. 138: 153-54). 
Velasquez testified that she was bleeding a great deal from the stab wound unc^ er 
her left arm in her rib area, but admitted that only "a couple dots" of blood were on the 
shirt she was wearing (R. 138: 159). Velasquez stated that the wound "was not deep at 
all;" her skin was broken, and it did not require any stitches (R. 138: 169, 174). 
Velasquez testified that the police never showed her any pictures of Slattery's 
truck (R. 138: 162). Velasquez testified that the truck that the man drove had a license 
plate in the back that "was off to the right instead of in the middle" and that the rear 
bumper had "dents" in it (R. 138: 163). Velasquez did not notice any lights on top of 
the truck nor an antenna (R. 138: 164). However, Velasquez testified that on the 
truck's tailgate was written Ford or Chevy in a different color than the rest of the truck 
(R. 138: 165). 
On rebuttal, Velasquez testified that after she heard Slattery testify, she again 
testified, "I am sure" that Slattery was the attacker because she recognized his voice as 
he was testifying (R. 139: 580). 
Testimony of Jay Primacio 
Jay Primacio testified that he was shopping with his mother at Wal-Mart on 
October 13, 2001 (R. 138: 189). Primacio testified that he and his mother finished 
shopping and left the store at 12:10 a.m. (R. 138: 190). As they went outside to the 
parking lot, Primacio heard a woman screaming and yell "help" and saw a man leaning 
into the car thrusting at her with his right hand (R. 138: 191-92). Primacio testified 
that he could not see much because "it was pretty dark" (R. 138: 194). Primacio also 
testified that the woman's car was "pretty far" away, "about probably 30 yards", and 
the attacker's truck was close to it (R. 138: 204, 205-06). 
Primacio testified that he saw the man walking away from the car and the man 
was wearing "boots, jeans, plaid shirt, hat, long hair," but the lighting "was pretty 
dark, so [I] couldn't get a full picture of him" (R. 138: 195). Primacio testified that the 
man's truck was "a blue truck" (R. 138: 196). The man got in his truck and drove off, 
but first hit a curb and his truck stalled (R. 138: 197-98). 
Primacio testified that he told Molis the license plate number and he went back 
inside the Wal-Mart and told a lady inside that was talking on the phone the license 
number (R. 138: 200). However, Primacio did not go back into the Wal-Mart and tell 
someone else the license plate number and write it down until "about a little over a half 
hour" (R. 138: 222). Primacio further testified that during this time, he did not write 
the number down on anything (R. 138: 225). Primacio also testified that he later wrote 
the license plate number down on a sheet of paper and the paper was admitted into 
evidence as State's Exhibit #6 (R. 138: 200). Primacio did not remember who he gave 
the slip of paper to (R. 138: 220). Primacio stated that the man that attacked that lady 
"looks like Joseph [Slattery]" (R. 138: 202). 
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Primacio testified that he told Officer Campbell at the scene that the assailant's 
height was "about five-ten, five-eleven" (R. 138: 208). However, on further 
questioning, Primacio admitted that he actually told Officer Campbell that the man's 
height was five-seven and the reason he changed his testimony was because "I have 
grown too, at the same time, so I'm guessing from the height I'm at right now" (R. 
138: 212). 
Primacio testified that he saw Slattery's truck outside of the courthouse the day 
of trial (R. 138: 226). Primacio testified that the license plate was 378 KRC, but he did 
not remember this number from the night of the incident (R. 138: 196). 
Testimony of Scott James Molis 
Scott Molis testified that he was at Wal-Mart located at 5400 South and 
Redwood Road on October 13, 2001, around midnight (R. 138: 232-33). Molis runs 
his own business, and uses a Chevy Blazer that pulls a twelve foot trailer with a power 
washing machine on the trailer (R. 138: 233). On that particular night, Molis testified 
that he had almost 300 gallons of water in his tank in order to clean the sidewalks (R. 
138: 233). Molis testified that Wal-Mart does not like him to start cleaning until after 
midnight because "a lot of people are coming out of the store at that time" (R. 138: 
234). 
Molis was beginning to start working when a woman drove up to his truck 
looking "really frantic" (R. 138: 235). Molis testified that the woman took "a Ml 
minute to calm down" before she could talk and told him "A man stabbed me" (R. 138: 
236). Molis had Velasquez pull up her shirt to see the wound, but he testified that "I 
didn't see any blood" (R. 138: 237, 255). Velasquez then pointed out her assailant, 
and Molis testified that he saw a man standing beside a light blue pickup truck (R. 138: 
238). The man was between five-seven and five-nine, "less than average stature" and 
had "longer than normal" dark brown hair and a "scruffy beard" (R. 138: 238). 
The man noticed Molis looking at him and then got in his truck to drive away 
(R. 138: 239). Molis sent Velasquez back inside the Wal-Mart and got in his own 
truck to chase after the man (R. 138: 240). Molis got within twenty feet of the light 
blue truck but could not make out the license plate number; he could only tell that it 
had Utah plates (R. 238: 240-41). 
After unsuccessfully chasing after the man, Molis came back to the Wal-Mart to 
talk with the police and see if Velasquez was alright (R. 138: 246). He also spoke with 
Primacio, and Primacio congratulated Molis for trying to chase the man (R. 138: 246). 
Molis testified that Slattery closely resembles the man he chased that night (R. 
138: 243). However, Molis testified that Slattery might net be the same person he saw 
that night (R. 138:246). 
Testimony of Officer Scott Daniels 
Officer Daniels testified that he is employed with the South Salt Lake police 
department, and on early Sunday morning, October 14, 2001, he was at the Paper 
Moon Bar located at 3424 South State Street talking to a security guard in the parking 
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lot (R. 138: 278-79). Daniels testified that he observed Slattery's vehicle parked in the 
parking lot at the Paper Moon Bar, then saw Slattery back "out of a parking stall and 
ran into another vehicle and then started to drive away" (R. 138: 280). Daniels farther 
testified that Slattery drove four hundred feet down the road before he pulled him over 
(R. 138: 280). 
Daniels testified that he called dispatch to let them know he had just seen a hit 
and run, and according to dispatch records, the time was 12: 32 a.m. (R. 138: 281). 
As Daniels spoke with Slattery, he testified that he smelled alcohol on him, so he called 
in another officer who performed the standard field sobriety tests on Slattery (R. 138: 
284). Daniels testified that the license plate number on Slattery's truck was 378 KRZ, 
and that the truck was a 1973 Chevy (R. 138: 286, 296). Daniels could not recall what 
Slattery was wearing or what he looked like the night he arrested him (R. 138: 286). 
Daniels impounded Slattery's truck and completed the accident forms at the 
scene of the accident, and estimated that he was at the scene for one hour (R. 138: 
284). 
Daniels testified that he had been talking with the security guard for at least five 
minutes, and he was certain Slattery was in the parking lot at least before 12:27 a.m. on 
October 14, 2001 (R. 138: 282, 303, 306). 
Testimony of James Flynn 
James Flynn testified that he works for J. P.'s Car star, an auto repair and towing 
company, and that on October 14, 2001, at 12: 20 a.m., he responded to a call to tow a 
truck in the area of 3424 South State Street (R. 138: 309-10, 311). Flynn testified that 
he towed a blue, 1973 Chevy pickup with license plate number 378 KRZ (R. 138: 310). 
The towing receipt was entered into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit #19 (R. 138: 476). 
Testimony of Jerry Townsend 
Officer Jerry Townsend testified that he is employed with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office, and that he was assigned to this case on October 17, 2001 (R. 139: 
329). On October 17, 2001, Townsend contacted Slattery and asked him to come to the 
sheriffs office and talk with him (R. 139: 330). Slattery agreed and voluntarily went 
and spoke with Townsend (R. 139: 330). 
Townsend testified that Slattery told him that he knew nothing about the incident 
that occurred at Wal-Mart on October 14, 2001 (R. 139: 334). Slattery further told 
Townsend that he was at the Good Spirits Bar located near 33rd South and Tenth West 
with other people, and that he left the bar around midnight (R. 139: 336, 340). Slattery 
stated that he left the Good Spirits Bar and went directly to the Million Dollar Saloon, 
although he was unsure how long it took him to get there (R. 139: 337-38). Slattery 
told Townsend that he sat in the Million Dollar Saloon parking lot for about half an 
hour (R. 139: 338). Slattery further told Townsend that he could not remember what 
he was wearing that night (R. 139: 371). Townsend never asked Slattery whether he 
went inside the Million Dollar Saloon (R. 139: 369). Slattery also informed Townsend 
that he had been drinking that night and that no one else had driven his truck (R. 1389: 
340). 
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Officer Townsend testified that he drove the route between the Wal-Mart located 
at 5400 South and Redwood Road and the Good Spirit Bar located at 10th West and 
33rd South, and that the distance was 4.2 miles and took seven minutes at 2:00 p.m. 
(R. 139: 347). 
Townsend testified that he showed Velasquez a photo array on October 23, 2001 
at his office (R. 139: 350). Velasquez took "probably five to ten minutes" before she 
picked out her assailant (R. 139: 352). Velasquez did not pick Slattery as her attacker, 
even though he was in the photo array (R. 139: 352, 379). 
On November 14, 2001, Townsend again asked Velasquez to come to his office 
and try again to pick out her attacker (R. 139: 352). Townsend showed Velasquez 
pictures of the same individuals as before, but this time the pictures were "black and 
white rather than in color and I had them set up on a piece of paper to show just a 
frontal view rather than front and side view" (R. 139: 353). State's Exhibit #13 is the 
photo array he showed Velasquez on November 14, 2001 (R. 139: 354). Velasquez 
again identified a person as her assailant and did not pick Slattery (R. 139: 354). 
Townsend testified that he failed to investigate the person Velasquez identified as 
her attacker, even though it was barely a week after the incident that she was able to 
identify her attacker, and that he failed to record who Velasquez picked out because 
"she did not pick the defendant in this case" (R. 139: 154, 379). 
Townsend also showed pictures to Scott Molis and he did not identify Slattery as 
the attacker either (R. 139: 359-60, 383). Molis identified three other people as 
possibly being the attacker, and again Townsend failed to investigate these men any 
farther (R. 139: 383-84). 
Townsend testified that the police report showed that the first officer arrived at 
the scene at 12:18 (R. 139: 357). No fingerprints were taken during the investigation 
(R. 139: 359). Townsend also testified that the police report showed that Jay Primack) 
provided the officers with the license plate number 378 KRZ (R. 139: 360). 
Townsend testified that he did not use any surveillance cameras at the Wal-Mart 
in his investigation (R. 139: 394-95). 
Testimony of David Gouge 
David Gouge testified that he and Slattery are friends and they used to work 
together at Sutherland Landscaping (R. 139: 404, 406). Gouge testified that on 
October 13, 2001, he called Slattery and asked him if he wanted to go out with him and 
two girls that night (R. 139: 410). 
Gouge went with a friend named Rebecca, who picked him up and they went 
together to the Good Spirits Bar at about 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. on October 13, 2001 (R. 
139: 414). Slattery arrived at the bar between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., and another woman 
arrived a little later and they all sat at the same booth (R. 139: 416, 423). Gouge 
testified that Slattery was wearing a tan shirt with a blue collar neck, Levis, and a 
"jester hat" (R. 139: 417). A picture of Slattery wearing the hat was entered into 
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit #'s 15 and 17 (R. 139: 420). 
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Gouge testified that they all left the bar about 11:40 p.m. and they decided to go 
to his house in one car (R. 139: 425). However, Slattery wanted to drive his truck and 
the others thought he was too drunk to drive, so one girl left in her own car (R. 139: 
428-29). Slattery decided to drive his truck anyway, and got in by himself and began 
to pull out of the parking lot when he backed into another car (R. 139: 429). Gouge 
called Slattery from the parking lot on his cell phone and told Slattery that he had just 
hit a car because Slattery was too intoxicated to realize that he hit a car (R. 139: 430). 
Slattery pulled his truck forward and locked the doors and got in another car with 
Gouge and Rebecca (R. 139: 431). This accident occurred around 11: 42 p.m. (R. 
139: 430). 
They left the bar in Rebecca's vehicle, but Slattery became "upset about leaving 
his truck" so they turned around and helped Slattery back into his own truck (R. 139: 
435). Gouge testified that he followed Slattery for a while to make sure he was alright, 
and he followed him heading South all the way down to about 9th West and 33rd South 
(R. 139: 436-37, 474). Gouge testified that he looked at his clock on his cell phone at 
this time and it was 12:05 a.m. (R. 139: 454). 
Gouge then went back to his house with Rebecca (R. 139: 443). Gouge testified 
that Slattery called him while he was home with Rebecca, and that Slattery asked him to 
come to the Million Dollar Saloon to help finish two pitchers of beer before the bar 
closed (R. 139: 444). Gouge testified that he could hear "bar sounds and activity and 
stuff in the background" during the phone call (R. 139: 444). Gouge told Slattery that 
he would not meet Slattery at the bar unless he wanted a ride (R. 139: 444). A short 
time later, Slattery again called Gouge, around 12:32 a.m., informing him that he just 
bumped into another car, and he asked Gouge to come get him (R. 139: 443, 446). 
Gouge went to get Slattery from the bar and saw that the officer had pulled him 
over and arrested him (R. 139: 448-49). Gouge testified that Slattery was still wearing 
a blue coat and "a king fool hat" and that his hair was in a pony tail (R. 139: 449, 
475). Gouge also testified that Slattery was wearing a shirt pictured as Defendant's 
Exhibit #21 (R. 139: 452). The "king fool hat" is pictured in Defendant's Exhibit #24 
(R. 139: 452). 
Gouge also testified that Defendant's Exhibit #13 was a picture of Slattery's 
truck the way it appeared on the night in question, except for the fact that the exhibit 
pictured Slattery's truck with a tailgate and Gouge testified that Slattery's truck did not 
have a tailgate at that time (R. 139: 438-39, 440). Gouge testified that Slattery's truck 
had a cargo net instead of a tailgate on the night in question (R. 139: 439). 
Testimony of Jerry Evans 
Jerry Evans testified that he has known Slattery for nine or ten years and that 
Slattery drives a light blue Chevy truck (R. 139: 477). Evans testified that three 
months previous to trial, he helped Slattery put a tailgate on the Chevy truck (R. 139: 
479). Evans also testified that the truck always had a black cargo net before he helped 
Slattery put a tailgate on it (R. 139: 480). 
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Evans further testified that he was "definitely" sure that Slattery's truck had the 
cargo net on it during the time in question (R. 139: 480-81). 
Testimony of David Loyola 
David Loyola testified that he is a private investigator hired to assist defense 
counsel in gathering evidence for this case (R. 139: 485). Loyola testified that he 
traveled from the Wal-Mart located at 5400 South and Redwood Road to the Million 
Dollar Club located at 3424 South State Street (R. 139: 486). Loyola timed how long it 
took to travel two different routes between these locations (R. 139: 486). 
On the first route, he left Wal-Mart on a Saturday at 12:00 a.m. on July 13, 
2002, and went to 5600 South, then east to 1500 West, then over to 5400 South and got 
on State Street (R. 139: 486, 488). From State Street, he went west on 3900 South to 
the Paper Moon Bar, which is 3424 South State Street (R. 139: 486). Loyola testified 
that this first trip covered a distance of 5.8 miles and took him 18 minutes to travel (R. 
139: 489). 
On the second route, he left the Wal-Mart parking lot and went to 5600 South, 
then up to 1500 West and then east on 5400 South (R. 139: 491). From there, he got 
on I - 15 and exited a t 33rd South and went to Main Street and made a right turn at 
the Paper Moon (R. 139: 491-92). Loyola testified he conducted this test a week 
before trial at 8:45 a.m. and that it took 17 minutes (R. 139: 490). 
Loyola also drove the distance between the Good Spirits Lounge and the Million 
Dollar Bar on Saturday, July 6, at 12:00 a.m. (R. 139: 493-94). Loyola testified that 
10 
the distance between these two bars was 2.9 miles and it took him 11 minutes to drive it 
(R. 139: 494). Loyola drove this same route a different time and it took him only 10 
minutes (R. 139: 494). 
And on July 23, 2002, Loyola drove the route between the Wal-Mart and the 
Good Spirits Lounge, and testified that it was a distance of 4.2 miles and takes 
approximately 12 minutes to travel (R. 139: 500). 
Testimony of Joseph Anthony Slattery, Jr. 
Joseph Slattery testified that he lives at 3980 South Main with his father and that 
he has worked for Sutherland's Landscaping since 1996 (R. 139: 505). On October 13, 
2002, Slattery testified that David Gouge called him and asked him if he wanted to go 
out with a couple of girls that night (R. 139: 506). 
Slattery testified that on the night in question, he was wearing a "Nike coat, in 
case it got cold, then I had my tan shirt, [and] my blue turtleneck ... , a pair of Levis. 
And I believe a pair of Red Wing boot or Cardinal boots" (R. 139: 508). He was also 
wearing his "king fool hat" all evening up until the time he was arrested (R. 139: 510). 
Slattery also testified that he was driving his 1973 Chevy pickup (R. 139: 511). 
Slattery testified that he arrived at the Good Spirits Lounge around 8:00 p.m., 
and sat with Gouge and the two other women (R. 139: 513). Slattery testified that he 
got really drunk (R. 139: 513). Slattery thought they left the Good Spirits Lounge 
between 11:20 and 11:45 (R. 139: 514). 
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Slattery testified that he remembered backing his truck into a parked car and 
Gouge helping him get out of the car (R. 139: 515-16). Form there, they got in one of 
the girl's van and started to go to Gouge's house (R. 139: 516). Slattery testified that 
he wanted to go home so he had them drop him off back at his truck (R. 139: 516). 
Slattery testified, "I started up my truck, let it warm up for a little while, I was 
trying to shake off the - being drunk" (R. 1 39: 516). After a while, Slattery left the 
Good Spirits Lounge and went to the Paper Moon bar looking for someone (R. 139: 
518). However, Slattery did not find the person he was looking for, so he walked over 
to the Million Dollar bar which is right next to the Paper Moon (R. 139: 518-19). 
Slattery testified that he ordered two pitchers of beer from inside the Million 
Dollar bar and also called Gouge on the pay phone inside the bar because he forgot hi* 
cell phone in the car (R. 139: 520). He asked Gouge to come and join him, but Gouge 
declined (R. 139: 521). Then, Slattery went back outside "and sat in my truck for 
awhile" (R. 139: 522). 
Slattery testified that he called Gouge again from his cell phone and told him that 
he was too drunk to drive, and then drove his truck anyway and hit a car (R. 139: 524). 
Slattery was on the phone with Gouge when he hit the car (R. 139: 524). 
Slattery also testified that he put a tailgate on his pickup truck on May 19, 2002 
(R. 139: 525). Slattery could remember this date because it is his father's birthday (R. 
139: 525). Before the hard tailgate was put on the truck, Slattery testified that he had a 
"black net" on it and that this net was there on October 14, 2001 (R. 139: 525-26). 
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Slattery farther testified shortly after he was arrested for the DUI, Officer 
Townsend asked him to come and talk to him about an assault that happened at the Wal-
Mart on Redwood Road (R. 139: 526-527). Slattery agreed and went and spoke with 
Townsend (R. 139: 527). 
Slattery testified that when he spoke to Townsend, he did not remember what he 
was wearing the night of October 13, 2001 (R. 139: 530). After speaking with 
Townsend, Slattery went and spoke with the people at the Good Spirits bar to see if 
anyone remembered what he was wearing that night (R. 139: 530). Slattery testified 
that the door guys did remember hem and said "I would never forget you because you 
hit a car in the parking lot and you were falling over drunk" (R. 139: 531). After 
speaking with the, Slattery remembered what he was wearing (R. 139: 531). 
Slattery testified that he never went to the Wal-Mart at 5400 South and Redwood 
Road on the night in question and that he had never met Rachel Velasquez (R. 139: 
536). Slattery further testified that his truck has never stalled because it has a brand 
new engine in it and an automatic transmission (R. 139: 537). Slattery also testified 
that he only has to shave once every week or two and that he is left-handed (R. 139: 
553, 566). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Slattery asserts that the victim's eyewitness identification was clearly the product 
of suggestion and therefore was constitutionally unreliable and should have been 
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excluded. The victim twice failed to identify Slattery as her attacker in photo arrays, 
and only identified Slattery after Officer Townsend pointed out Slattery to her before 
the preliminary hearing and told her, "That's Joseph Slattery." Trial counsel's failure 
to move to exclude the identification constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
but for this failure, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. 
Slattery also asserts that the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he 
assaulted the victim and that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the 
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury. 
The evidence clearly established that Slattery could not have been at the Wal-
Mart at the time the assault occurred. Moreover, the victim repeatedly identified 
someone other than Slattery as her assailant and was only able to bolster her beliei thai 
Slattery was the attacker after Officer Townsend pointed Slattery out to her at the 
preliminary hearing. Not only did the victim identify someone other than Slattery as 
the attacker, but a witness at the scene also identified someone other that Slattery to be 
the possible attacker. Additionally, the victim testified that her assailant's truck had a 
tailgate, but the evidence clearly established that Slattery's truck had a black cargo net 
instead of a tailgate the night of the incident. Thus, not only was the evidence 
insufficient, but the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court 
committed plain error in submitting this case to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE A MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BECAUSE THE IDENTIFICATION WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
UNRELIABLE 
Slattery asserts that Velasquez's eyewitness identification at trial violated his 
right to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution because 
the identification was unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. Slattery's trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request that the identification be 
excluded because the identification would have been excluded by the trial court had 
such a motion been made or if trial counsel had requested a reliability hearing. Slattery 
asserts that he was also prejudiced by this failure since this case turned on eyewitness 
identification. Slattery asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand this matter 
to the District Court if, in the alternative, this Court finds the evidence si ffici^nt to 
support the conviction. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
KeUey, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1 P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah 1994)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). Where the 
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the 
issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), 
cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
outcome, we consider "the totality of the evidence taking into account such factors as 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and 
how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 
(Utah 1999) (citation omitted). 
In State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, 47 P.3d 115, this Court acknowledged 
that "eyewitness testimony is both potent and yet fallible; thereby requiring the trial 
court, in instances where eyewitness identification is central to the case, to undertake 
'an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability,' before admitting such testimony 
under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution." Id. at f 19 (citiig State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
Therefore, the following pertinent factors must be considered under the 
totality of the circumstances when determining whether an eyewitness's identification is 
reliable: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
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Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the defendant was convicted of 
aggravated robbery, and appealed claiming that an eyewitness identification of him was 
unconstitutionally suggestive and unreliable. Id. at 775-6. The facts in Ramirez are as 
follows: Shortly before one o'clock, three people were leaving a Pizza Hut where they 
were accosted and robbed by two men wearing white scarves across their faces. Id. at 
776. One man had a pipe and hit one of the witnesses (Wilson) with it while the other 
assailant held them at gun point. Id. Both robbers fled and the witnesses contacted the 
police. Id. A short time later, an officer that had not yet heard about the robbery 
observed two men walking south in the same neighborhood as the incident. Id. Upon 
seeing the police car, one man fled from sight, so the officer stopped the other man. 
Id. A few minutes later, other officers arrived and when word came that a suspect had 
been detained, the officers with the witnesses told the witnesses that they "had found 
someone who matched the description of one of the robbers." Id. at 777. The 
identification showup then occurred under the following circumstances: It was 
approximately one o'clock in the morning. Ramirez, a dark complexioned Apache 
Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the only suspect present and was 
surrounded by police officers. The police turned the headlights and spotlights from the 
police cars on Ramirez to provide enough light. The witnesses viewed Ramirez by 
looking at him from the back seat of a police car. Of the three witnesses, only Wilson 
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identified Ramirez as the masked man with the gun; the other two witnesses were 
unable to identify him as one of the robbers. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed these facts and determined that the 
eyewitness identification was properly admitted. The Court first considered "the 
opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
782. The witness testified that he viewed the gunman "a minute" or longer and the 
distance between them was about "ten feet." Id. Although the witness could not see 
the gunman's face, he testified that he "could see enough to know" and that the gunman 
had small eyes. Id. 
The second factor that the Court considered was the witness's degree of attention 
to the gunmen. Id. at 783. The Court found that the witness "was fully aware that a 
robbery was taking place." Id. The witness testified that he stared at the gunman, 
trying to get a good description. Id. 
Regarding the third factor, the Court found that although the witness experienced 
a heightened degree of stress, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the 
witness was impaired and unable to view the gunman. Id. 
Under the fourth factor, the Court found that the time between the event and the 
identification was minimal, only being 30 minutes. Id. The court also found 
discrepancies in the witness's identification when the witness testified for the first time 
at trial that he had seen tattoos on the gunman. Id. 
Under the fifth factor, the Court stated that the "blatant suggestiveness of the 
showup is troublesome." Id. at 784. The witness viewed the gunman from the back 
seat of a police car with remarks of the police officers prior to the showup that they had 
apprehended someone who fit the description of one of the robbers. Id. 
The Court in Ramirez concluded, "having considered all the factors, we find this 
to be an extremely close case," but "considering the facts in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's decision . . . we cannot say that [the] testimony is legally insufficient." 
Id. 
A. Velasquez's Identification was Constitutionally Unreliable 
Slattery asserts that Velasquez identification was clearly the product of 
suggestion to such an extent that it was constitutionally unreliable and this testimony 
should not have been admitted at trial. Unlike Ramirez, this is not "an extremely close 
case," but rather a fundamental violation of Slattery's right to clue process that should 
have been obvious to the trial court. 
On October 23, 2001, a little over a week after the incident, Officer Townsend 
showed Velasquez a photo array that pictured Slattery (R. 138: 95, 138). Velasquez 
pointed out the man she believed was her attacker and she did not choose Slattery (R. 
138: 138). That same day, Townsend took Velasquez to see Slattery's truck, and 
obviously would have told her whose truck she was being shown (R. 139: 578, 582). 
And on November 14, Townsend again showed Velasquez a photo array that 
featured Slattery, and again Velasquez identified her attacker and she did not choose 
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Slattery (R. 138: 142). One of the officers then told her, "You know what? It's not 
that guy." (R. 138: 143). 
Thus, before the preliminary hearing, Velasquez knew that she had not yet 
identified the man that the police believed was the attacker and she apparently knew 
that a man named "Joseph Slattery" was the only suspect. Then, at the preliminary 
hearing, before Velasquez ever took the stand to testify, Officer Townsend pointed 
Slattery out to Velasquez and said, "That is Joseph Slattery" (R. 137: 26; 138: 143^ 
Upon hearing this, defense counsel asked Velasquez at the preliminary hearing, 
"But if you couldn't pick him out that - with in two weeks afterwards out of a photo 
lineup, how can we rely on your testimony that this is the man - who was the person 
that stabbed you?" (R. 137: 26). Velasquez stood silent for over 12 seconds, a~1 then 
finally answered, "I don't even know how to answer it" (R. 137: 27). Velasquez then 
admitted that her identification was a product of influence (R. 137: 28). 
Moreover, Velasquez changed her testimony after Officer Townsend told her 
"that's Joseph Slattery" (R.138: 143). She first told Officer Campbell at the scene of 
the incident that her attacker appeared to be in the age range of 30 to 49; but after 
Officer Townsend pointed Slattery out to Velasquez, she changed her testimony and 
testified that her attacker was in his "20 to 30's" (R. 138: 133). 
She also testified at the preliminary hearing, again after Townsend pointed 
Slattery out to her, that she was only "above fifty percent" sure that Slattery was her 
attacker; but at trial she testified before the jury, "I am sure" that Slattery was the 
attacker (R. 138: 94, 146). Even Velasquez's rebuttal testimony that she recognized 
Slattery's voice must be tempered by her admission that she wanted Slattery to be her 
attacker (R. 138: 153-54; 139: 580). 
Velasquez's identification is distinguishable from the eyewitness identification in 
Ramirez since Velasquez did not identify Slattery has her attacker (and in fact twice 
identified someone other than Slattery as her attacker) until Townsend specifically 
pointed Slattery out to her at the preliminary hearing. If is farther distinguishable 
because her testimony about her attacker's appearance changed to fit Slattery's 
appearance after Townsend pointed Slattery out to her. Under the factors set forth in 
Ramirez, Velasquez's eyewitness identification was obviously constitutionally unreliable 
since it was inconsistent and was completely the product of suggestion. 
If trial counsel had moved to exclude Velasquez's eyewitness identification, the trial 
court would have granted that request thus limiting the testimony inferring thai Slattery 
was the attacker. 
B. Velasquez's Identification Affected the Verdict 
Velasquez testified before the jury that she was "sure" that Slattery was the 
individual that attacked her (R. 138: 94). However, the other two eyewitnesses 
testified that they could not be sure that Slattery was the man they saw that night (R. 
138: 202, 246). As argued below in Point II, the evidence, including Velasquez's 
identification was insufficient to support the jury verdict. If Velasquez's eyewitness 
identification had been properly excluded, the evidence would have been so slight and 
unconvincing that a reasonable person would have reasonable doubt that Slattery 
committed the crime. 
Moreover, had the eyewitness identification been excluded, the jury would not 
have heard Velasquez testify "I am sure" Slattery was the attacker (R. 138: 94). The 
jury would have to weigh Gouge's testimony that he saw Slattery at 9th South and 33rd 
West at 12:05, the time the incident occurred, with the fact that Velasquez twice failed 
to pick Slattery out of photo lineups, that Molis also failed to pick Slattery out of a 
photo lineup, and that Primacio was unsure if Slattery was at the scene (R. 139: 454, 
474). Without Velasquez's identification at trial, Primacio's testimony regarding the 
license plate and Velasquez's subsequent voice identification on rebuttal would have 
been less credible and would have resulted in a different jury verdict. 
Accordingly, Slattery requests that this Court conclude that he was denied his 
constitutional right to competent counsel. 
TL. SLATTERY ESTABLISHED THAT HE WAS NOT AND COULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN AT THE WAL-MART WHERE THE WOMAN 
WAS ASSAULTED AND THEREFORE IT WAS PLAIN ERROR 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT THIS CASE TO THE 
JURY 
The evidence established that Slattery could not have been at the Wal-Mart 
where the assault occurred. Moreover, the victim repeatedly identified someone other 
than Slattery as her attacker and she identified a different pickup truck as the get-a-way 
vehicle her attacker used, rather than Slattery's pickup truck. Slattery asserts that the 
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evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the aggravated assault and that 
it was plain error for the trial court to submit this case to the jury. 
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can 
demonstrate that... 'p lain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11, 10 
P.3d 346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant 
must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at f 17. 'To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
f 14., 989 P.2d 1065 (qioting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 18 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting 
the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 17. 
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A. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Conviction 
A review of all the evidence shows not only that the victim repeatedly identified 
someone other than Slattery has her attacker, but that Slattery could not have been at 
the Wal-Mart where the assault occurred. 
In State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), the defendant was convicted of 
aggravated murder and claimed on appeal, among other things, that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Id. at 338. The facts of the case, presented in 
a light most favorable to the jury verdict are as follows: 
On November 7, 1993, the defendant called 911 after she found her employer 
dead in his home. Id. at 339. When the police arrived at the home, they found the 
defendant emotionally distraught on the porch outside the home. Id. The body was 
inside the home and had been shot in the head. Id. The defendant told the police that 
she had worked for the deceased in his apartment rental business, and that she had gone 
to his home on Saturday afternoon, November 6, to give him a pot of soup because he 
was ill. Id. The deceased was not home so she left the soup on the porch with a note. 
Id. She returned the next morning to check on her employer and found the soup still on 
the porch, so she went to her truck and retrieved a key her employer's house and went 
inside and discovered his body. Id. 
There was no forced entry into the home and the only thing obviously missing 
was the deceased's wallet. Id. The defendant was questioned numerous times and was 
also searched. Id. 
An autopsy revealed that the deceased had been shot three times with a .22 
caliber handgun. Id. The deceased owned a .22 caliber Colt Woodsman and tests 
suggested that the murder weapon may have been such a weapon. Id. However, neither 
the deceased's gun nor any murder weapon was ever found. Id. Police also found 
traces of blood around the kitchen sink and a small hand print on the front door, but the 
police did not match the print to the defendant. Id. In fact, no physical evidence linked 
the defendant to the murder. Id. 
Police also found that the deceased's October 1993 bank statement and several 
cancelled checks were missing. Id. The deceased was known for keeping complete 
financial records. Id. The police also discovered that there were missing checks to 
prior months, and that these missing checks were payable to the defendant. Id. An 
expert document examiner determined that that the checks were forgeries. Id. 
The time of death was determined to be at approximately 7 a.m. on Saturday, 
November 6, 1993, and the defendant could not account for her whereabouts between 
6:40 a.m. and 10 a.m. on Saturday, November 6. Id. at 340. 
In Brown, the Utah Supreme Court noted "that there was no direct evidence that 
[the defendant] committed the murder. The State's case was based solely on 
circumstantial evidence." Id. at 344. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined, "we 
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must determine (1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element 
of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each 
legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally 
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." Id, 
There was no dispute that the deceased had been murdered intentionally, so the 
only issue was whether the defendant committed the crime. Id. The Supreme Court 
determined that the jury had the following evidence to consider (in summation): 
(1) There were no signs of a forced entry into the home. (2) Only the defendant and the 
deceased had keys to the home. (3) The defendant had been in the deceased's home 
often. (4) The deceased was shot with a .22 caliber handgun and his handgun was 
missing and the same brands of bullets that killed him were found in a drawer in his 
bedroom. (5) The time of death was likely between 9 p.m Friday, November 5, and 3 
a.m. Sunday, November 7. (6) The defendant could not account for her whereabouts 
between 6:40 a.m. and 10: a.m. on Saturday. (7) A neighbor testified that she heard 
two "pops" at approximately 7 a.m. (8) The only property missing from the residence 
were the October bank statement and canceled checks, his .22 caliber Colt Woodsman, 
and his wallet. (9) The postmaster testified it was ninety-seven percent likely that the 
deceased received his bank statement and cancelled checks before he was last seen 
alive. (10) The deceased was fastidious with his financial records and family members 
testified that he would likely have confronted someone who violated his trust. (11) In 
the defendant's original statement to the police, she stated that she left the soup on the 
porch because she did not want to disturb her employer; however, in a later statement, 
she said she left the soup there because she thought he was not at home and she did not 
want to go inside. (12) Defendant was emotionally distraught when the police and 
neighbors arrived at the scene. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344-45. 
The Supreme Court in Brown considered this evidence and concluded that it was 
not unreasonable for the jury to infer from the evidence the following (in summation): 
(1) Whoever killed the deceased gained entrance by the use of a key and the deceased 
was shot while asleep in bed. (2) The deceased was shot around 7 a.m. on Saturday. (3) 
It is likely that the deceased was killed with his own gun. (4) The defendant was in a 
posh ion to know where the deceased kept his gun and financial papers since she had 
been in his home before. (5) Defendant had a personal interest in the items stolen 
because of the check forgeries. (6) Defendant gave inconsistent statements to the police 
regarding the soup. (7) The defendant could not account for her whereabouts at 7 a.m. 
(8) It was likely that the defendant killed the deceased since they were the only two 
persons known to have keys to the house. Id. at 345-46. 
The Supreme Court concluded that in view of the reasonable inferences drawn 
from the evidence, "we cannot say that the evidence was so inconclusive and inherently 
improbable that the jury could not have found that each element of the crime had been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 346. 
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Slattery asserts that the facts in this case are distinguishable from Brown and that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict. The following is a summation of 
all the evidence which supports the jury's verdict. 
At 12:00 a.m., October 14, 2001, Rachel Velasquez clocked out of work at the 
Wal-Mart located at 5400 South and Redwood Road (R. 138: 71, 111). A few minutes 
later, Velasquez left the Wal-Mart building and went to the parking lot and entered her 
car (R. 138: 73, 122). Once she got in her car, a man approached her and asked her if 
she would help him start his truck (R. 138: 75, 78). The man appeared to be drunk, so 
Velasquez declined to offer any help (R. 138: 79). The man then jabbed her several 
times with a screwdriver or ice pick (R. 138: 79-80, 177-78). The wounds were 
fortunately only superficial (R. 138: 169, 174). The assault occurred sometime around 
12:05 a.m. (R. 138: 71, 74, 122, 190). 
Velasquez was able to get away from the attacker and drove her car near the 
Wal-Mart exit door (R. 138: 82). Scott Molis, who was about to begin work cleaning 
the sidewalks with his pressure washing machine located on his truck, was there and 
Velasquez told him what happened (R. 138: 83, 85). The attacker was still in the 
parking lot by his truck, so Molis decided to chase after him in his own work truck (R. 
138: 240). Molis got within 20 feet of the attacker's truck but could not make out the 
license plate number (R. 138: 240). Molis testified though that the truck had Utah 
plates (R. 138: 241). 
Jay Primacio was also at the Wal-Mart that night and saw from a distance what 
took place (R. 138: 190-92). Primacio testified that it was pretty dark and that 
Velasquez's car was "pretty far" away, "probably 30 yards" (R. 138: 206). Primacio 
saw the man lean into Velasquez's care and thrust at her with his right hand several 
times (R. 138: 192-92). Primacio also saw the man get into his truck and drive off (R. 
138: 197-98). Primacio testified that he memorized the license plate number to the 
truck and told the officer at the scene what the number was about 30 minutes after the 
incident occurred (R. 138: 122). 
Although the lighting was dim, Velasquez told the officers at the scene that her 
attacker was wearing a dark baseball cap and a flannel jacket with plaid colors (R. 138: 
76). She also told the officers that the man had a "full beard" that was "brown and 
scraggly" and straight hair that was not in a pony tail and appeared to be 30 to 49 years 
old (R. 138: 76, 130, 133). 
Velasquez did not remember giving the police a description of her attacker's 
truck that night, but she testified at trial that the truck was light blue, with the license 
plate off to the right, not in the middle like most cars (R. 138: 90-91). Velasquez also 
testified that her attacker's truck also had a tailgate with the name Ford or Chevy on it 
(R. 139: 586). 
Molis testified that the attacker was between five-seven and five-nine, "less than 
average statute" and had "longer than normal" dark brown hair and a scruffy beard" 
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(R. 138: 238). Molis also testified that Slattery closely resembles the man he chased 
that night (R. 138: 243). 
Primacio also testified that the attacker was wearing "boots, jeans, plaid shirt, 
hat, long hair," but the lighting "was pretty dark, so [I] couldn't get a full picture of 
him" (R. 138: 195). Primacio further testified that the man that attacked Velasquez 
"looks like Joseph [Slattery]" (R. 138: 202). 
The State also presented evidence that Slattery was pulled over for a DUI at 
12:32 a.m. on October 14, 2001, near the Paper Moon Bar located at 3424 South State 
Street (R. 138: 278, 280). Officer Daniels testified for the State that he observed 
Slattery back into another vehicle at the Paper Moon Bar and then drive away (R. 138: 
280). Officer Daniels also testified that Slattery was in the parking lot at least before 
12:27 a.m. (R. 138: 282, 303, 306). 
Daniels further testified that Slattery was driving a 1973 Chevy truck with 
license plate number 378 KRZ; however Daniels could not remember what Slattery 
looked like or what he was wearing that night (R. 138: 286, 296). 
Officer Jerry Townsend also testified for the State (R. 138: 329). Townsend 
interviewed Slattery around October 17, 2002 about what he was doing on the night and 
early morning of October 13 and 14 (R. 128: 334). Slattery volunteered for the 
interview, and told Townsend that he was at the Good Spirits Bar located near 33rd 
South and Tenth West with other people close to midnight on October 13 (R. 138: 336, 
340). After he left that bar, he went directly to the Million Dollar Saloon and sat in the 
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parking lot for about a half hour (R. 138: 338). Slattery also told Townsend that he 
could not remember what he was wearing that night (R. 139: 371). 
These marshaled facts are distinguishable from the facts in Brown and are clearly 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
i. Velasquez's identification is sufficiently inconclusive and improbable. 
Slattery asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he assaulted Velasquez. Although 
Velasquez testified at trial that she was "sure" that Slattery was the individual that 
attacked her and that she recognized his voice at trial, all the evidence shows that 
Slattery was not the attacker (R. 138: 94; 139: 580). 
On two separate occasions, Officer Townsend showed Velasquez different photo 
arrays, both of which had pictures of Slattery (R. 138: 95, 141). However, on both 
occasions, Velasquez made a positive identification of her attacker and she clearly did 
not choose Slattery (R. 138: 95, 138, 142). 
Moreover, Velasquez testified that the truck her attacker drove that night had a 
tailgate with the word Chevy or Ford on it (R. 139: 579, 586). But when Officer 
Townsend showed her Slattery's truck only a week after the incident, Velasquez "was 
surprised" that the truck had a black net on the back instead of a tailgate (R. 139: 578, 
582). Both Jerry Evans and David Gouge testified that Slattery's truck in fact had a 
black cargo net instead of a tailgate that night (R. 139: 438-39, 480-81). 
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And at the preliminary hearing, even after Officer Townsend pointed Slattery out 
to Velasquez so she could identify him in the courtroom, Velasquez testified that she 
was only just "above fifty percent" sure that Slattery was the culprit (R. 138: 143, 
146). Furthermore, at trial when Velasquez was asked, "I guess you want him to be 
the person," Velasquez responded, "I guess I do" (R. 138: 153-54). 
ii. Primacio's testimony regarding the license plate was insufficient to 
establish that Slattery was the attacker, 
Slattery asserts that Primacio's identification of the license plate was insufficient 
to establish that he was the attacker, particularly in the light of Velasquez and Molis 
being unable to identify Slattery. Considering that Velasquez twice identified someone 
other than Slattery as her attacker, Molis also identified someone other than Slattery as 
the attacker, and the unreliability of Velasquez's identification at trial, the license plate 
was insufficient to link Slattery to the crime. 
Additionally, Primacio testified that the Wal-Mart parking lost "was pretty dark" 
and that Velasquez's car was "about probably 30 yards" away, and that the attacker's 
truck was close to the car (R. 128: 194, 204, 205-06). 
iii. The evidence showed that Slattery was not at the Wal-Mart when the 
attack occurred. 
Slattery asserts that he was not and could not have been at the Wal-Mart on 
October 14, 2001, when the attack occurred. The State presented evidence from 
Officer Daniels that Slattery was at the Paper Moon Bar, located at 3424 South State 
Street, at 12:27 a.m. or even before that time (R. 138: 282, 303, 306). 
Moreover, David Gouge testified under oath that he was with Slattery that night, 
and the last time he saw Slattery was at 12:05 a.m. near 9th West and 33rd South (R. 
139: 436-37, 454, 474). Because the attack occurred around this time, Slattery could 
not have been the individual who attacked Velasquez. 
Slattery was first at the Good Spirits Lounge with Gouge and other friends (R. 
139: 513). They left the bar at about 11:40 p.m., and Slattery then got in his truck and 
backed into a car (R. 139: 425, 428-29). This accident occurred at about 11:42 p.m. 
(R. 139: 430). Slattery then left his truck at the Good Spirits Lounge and drove with 
Gouge and another woman for a while, and then they took Slattery back to his truck (R. 
130: 435). Slattery then got back in his truck and left the bar, and Gouge testified that 
he followed Slattery heading south all the way down to about 9th West and 33rd South 
(R. 139: 436-37, 474). 
From there, Slattery went to the Paper Moon Bar, located at 3424 South State 
Street, and parked his truck there (R. 139: 486, 518). Slattery then walked to the 
Million Dollar Saloon, which is right next to the Paper Moon bar (R. 139: 518-19). 
Slattery even called Gouge from a pay phone inside the bar (R. 139: 444, 520). A 
short time later, Slattery left the bar and got in his truck, again backing into a parked 
car, and was pulled over for a DUI by Officer Daniels (R. 138: 280; 139: 443). 
Furthermore, David Loyola testified that he drove the route between the WaJ-
Mart at 5400 South and Redwood Road and the Paper Moon Bar (R. 139: 485). 
Loyola drove this route at 12 a.m. on Saturday, July 12, 2002, a night similar to the 
night in question (R. 139: 486). This route took 18 minutes to travel (R. 139: 489). 
Townsend also drove this route and testified that it took him 13 minutes to complete, 
but he drove this route at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon instead at night, when the incident 
occurred (R. 139: 345-46). 
Additionally, Gouge testified that Slattery was wearing a tan shirt with a blue 
collar neck, Levis, and a "jester hat" (R. 139: 417). This evidence shows that Slattery 
was not the attacker. Both Velasquez and Primacio testified that the attacker was 
wearing a plaid shirt or jacket and a ball cap (R. 138: 76, 195). Velasquez also told the 
officer at the scene that her attacker had a "full beard" and that he appeared to be in his 
40's, but after seeing Slattery for the first time at the preliminary hearing, she testified 
at trial that her attacker had a "brown and scraggly" beard and he was in his "20 to 
30's" (R. 138: 76, 132-33, 143). 
Slattery asserts that this evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he 
attacked Velasquez. Velasquez identified someone other than Slattery as her attacker 
and Slattery presented evidence that he could not have been at the scene. These facts 
are clearly distinguishable from Brown. In Brown, the jury could reasonable infer from 
the evidence that the defendant's motive for killing her employer was pecuniary gain, 
since she was stealing money from him via forged checks. Brown, 948 P.2d at 345-46. 
However, in this case, there was no evidence regarding motive for the jury to infer that 
Slattery wanted to assault Velasquez. 
Also in Brown, the jury could infer that the defendant committed the murder 
because she was the only one that had a key to the deceased's residence, and there was 
no evidence of a forced entry. Id. at 345. However, in this case, the jury heard 
evidence that Velasquez twice identified someone other than Slattery as her attacker and 
that Velasquez testified that her assailant's truck had a tailgate (R. 138: 95, 142; 139: 
586). Moreover, Molis also identified someone other than Slattery as the possible 
attacker in a photo array (R. 139: 383-84). 
Furthermore, the defendant in Brown could not account for her whereabouts 
when the murder occurred. Id. at 346. Not only could Slattery account for his 
whereabouts, but several witnesses testified as to his whereabouts that night and early 
morning (R. 138: 278-81; 139: 454). 
The only evidence supporting the verdict is Primacio's improbable testimony of 
the license plate. But in order to believe this single thread of evidence, the jury would 
have to totally disregard the fact that Velasqeuz twice identified someone other than 
Slattery as her attacker and Molis also identified persons other than Slattery as the 
possible attacker. The jury would also had to infer that Primacio was able to see the 
license plate, even though he testified that he could not see much because "it was pretty 
dark" and that the attacker's truck was far away (R. 138: 194, 204-06), and that 
Primacio could also correctly remember the number for at least 30 minutes without 
writing it down (R. 138: 222). This becomes even more unreasonable considering thitt 
Primacio testified that he thought the attacker, who was a grown man, would have 
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grown a few inches because "I have grown too" (R. 138: 212). The jury would also 
have to completely disregard Gouge's testimony that he saw Slattery at 12:05 a.m., the 
time the incident occurred (R. 139: 454). 
Velasquez's repeated identifications of someone other than Slattery as the 
attacker, Primacio's improbable testimony, and Slattery's alibi defense show that the 
evidence was inherently improbable that Slattery committed the crime. Thus, it was 
unreasonable for the jury to infer from all the evidence that Slattery was the individual 
who attacked Velasquez. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting the Case to the Jury 
Slattery asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he 
assaulted Velasquez. Although this issue was not preserved below, Slattery asserts that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court committed plain 
error in submitting the case to the jury. 
The purpose of review under a plain error standard is to "avoid injustice." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 113 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
To prove aggravated assault in this instance, the State had to present evidence 
showing that Slattery used a dangerous weapon in assaulting Velasquez (R. 88). The 
State did present evidence that the individual who attacked Velasquez did so with some 
type of a weapon, maybe a screwdriver or an ice pick, sufficiently constituting a 
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dangerous weapon (R. 138: 79-80). However, as argued above, the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish that Slattery was the 
individual who assaulted Velasquez. The evidentiary defect was so obvious and 
fundamental that it was plain error to submit this case to the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 
at ^17. But for this eiror, Slattery would not have been convicted. 
C. Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict Constituted 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Slattery's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 
S.Ct. 706, 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on 
failure to move to dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Kelley, 
2000 UT 41 at 125 (citation omitted). As stated above, the evidence was insufficient as 
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a matter of law to submit this case to the jury. Accordingly, trial counsel's 
performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict under the reasoning 
set forth Reyes. But for this failure, this case would not have been submitted to the jury 
and Slattery would not have been convicted of aggravated assault. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Slattery asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
aggravated assault. In the alternative, Slattery asks this Court to remand this matter to 
the District Court for further proceedings. 
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76-5-101 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 300 
Section 
76-5-411 
76-5-412, 
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child 
victim of sexual abuse 
Custodial sexual relations — Custodial sexual 
misconduct — Definitions — Penalties — 
Defenses 
P a r t 5 
HIV Tes t i ng — Sexua l Offenders a n d Vic t ims 
76-5-501. Definitions. 
76-5-502. Mandatory testing — Liability for costs. 
76-5-503. Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs 
paid by Crime Victim Reparations. 
76-5-504. Victim notification and counseling. 
P A R T I 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who 
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arres t or 
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility 
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the 
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the con-
finement is legal. 1994 
76-5-102, Assault . 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat , accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another, or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
tha t causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowl-
edge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
caused serious bodily injury to another. 2000 
76-5-102,3. Assault against school employees , 
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or 
private school, with knowledge tha t the individual is an 
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of 
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 
(2) As used in this section, "employee** includes a volunteer. 
1992 
76-5-102.4, Assault against peace officer — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge 
tha t he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or 
another correctional facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of 
the sentence required under Subsection (2) if the court finds 
tha t the interests of justice would be best served and makes 
specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the 
record. 1998 
76-5-102.5. Assau l t by p r i s o n e r . 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1974 
76-5-102.6. Assault o n a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-5-102.7. Assault aga ins t health care provider and 
emergency medical service worker — Pen-
alty. 
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or emer-
gency medical service worker is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor if: 
(a) the person knew tha t the victim was a health care 
provider or emergency medical service worker; and 
(b) the health care provider or emergency medical 
service worker was performing emergency or life saving 
duties within the scope of his authority at the time of the 
assault. 
(2) As used in this section: 
(a) "Emergency medical service worker" means a per-
son certified under Section 26-8a-302. 
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided 
in Section 78-14-3. 1999 
76-5-102.8. Disarming a peace officer. 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally 
takes or removes, or a t tempts to take or remove, a firearm 
from the person or immediate presence of a person he knows 
is a peace officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of 
his authority as a peace officer. 1999 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violationof Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony 
1995 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital felony 
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated assault 
is guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the second degree if no serious bodily 
injury was intentionally caused; or 
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily injury 
was intentionally caused. „ 
(2) For the purpose of this section, "serving a sentence 
means sentenced and committed to the custody of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, the sentence has not been terminated 0 
voided, and the prisoner is: 
(a) not on parole; or 
(b) in custody after arrest for a parole violation. 
76-5-104. Consensua l altercation. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution 
-2001 
2 of 
that 
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, 
other consensual altercation if during the course of the <*u ' 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defhie 
